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The Right to Silence: Inferences and Interference 
 
Introduction 
In August 2012, the government of New South Wales (NSW) announced plans to 
bring forward legislation which would curtail the right to silence of a suspect in a 
criminal case, while under police questioning, by allowing for an adverse inference to 
be drawn from such silence at subsequent trial (O’Farrell 2012). The Evidence 
Amendment (Evidence of Silence) Act 2013, which gives effect to this proposal, 
provides for the insertion of s 89A into the Evidence Act 1995 in the following terms:  
‘(1) In a criminal proceeding for a serious indictable offence, such 
unfavourable inferences may be drawn as appear proper from evidence that, 
during official questioning in relation to the offence, the defendant failed or 
refused to mention a fact: 
(a) that the defendant could reasonably have been expected to mention in the 
circumstances existing at the time, and 
(b) that is relied on in his or her defence in that proceeding.’ 
 
This Act was passed by the Parliament of NSW and assented to on 25 March 2013, 
though it is yet to be proclaimed. Its content goes against the recommendations of the 
NSW Law Reform Commission, contained in their 2000 report (NSW Law Reform 
Commission 2000:2.138), and, outside of the government and the police, it seems that 
most significant participants in the criminal process were opposed to the introduction 
of s 89A.
1
 While reference was made in a number of submissions on the original Bill 
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(the Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) Bill 2012) and in the Law Reform 
Commission report, to similar provisions introduced in England and Wales and in 
Singapore, there has been little reference to restrictions on the right to silence in the 
Republic of Ireland (hereinafter referred to as Ireland).
2
 Ireland, an oft-forgotten (or, 
perhaps, ignored) common law jurisdiction, is a good comparator to NSW on this 
issue, not least because of the absence in both jurisdictions of duty solicitor schemes 
for the provision of legal advice to suspects. Knowledge of the experience of 
interferences with the pre-trial right to silence in Ireland might be beneficial to 
lawmakers and other interested parties, not only in NSW but in any jurisdiction 
considering interference with the right to silence. In New Zealand, for example, the 
right to silence
3
 has recently been compromised under the examination order 
provisions of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012.   
 
This article outlines the manner in which restrictions on the pre-trial right to silence 
came to have a place in Irish law, making comparative comment on the newly-created 
s 89A in NSW. The article highlights the initial introduction of an inference-drawing 
provision similar to that now in existence under s 89A and the subsequent acceptance 
of inference-drawing provisions of a more expansive nature in later years. Along with 
the Irish experience, reference is made throughout to issues arising under s 34 of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in England and Wales, and relevant 
                                                                                                                                            
1
 The NSW Bar Association suggested that ‘The government should abandon this proposal, for which 
no relevant stakeholders (apart from the police) advocate’ (NSW Bar Association 2012:16). 
2
 Three sentences of the NSW Law Reform Commission report referenced the Irish position, as it stood 
in 2000 (NSW Law Reform Commission 2000:2.29). Besides the fact that this is an extremely brief 
explication of the situation in Ireland, significant changes in the Irish regime have occurred since then. 
Notably, Dr Jeremy Gans’ submission on the Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) Bill 2012 
does make reference to some elements of the Irish situation (Gans 2012). 
3
 Protected under ss 23(4) and 25(d) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. See also s 32 of the 
Evidence Act 2006 in that jurisdiction. 
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decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, particularly in the context of the 
interaction between the right to silence and the right to legal advice. 
 
The right to silence: A fundamental right 
The right to silence, often interchangeably or alternatively referred to as the ‘privilege 
against self-incrimination’,4 may be thought to include a number of different 
protections, or immunities,
5
 but in basic terms, in the context of criminal proceedings, 
it is the entitlement of a suspect to refuse to answer questions put to him/her or to 
provide any information to the prosecution (McGrath 2005:11.04). It applies both at 
trial, where it operates as a right to refuse to take the stand and give evidence, and 
pre-trial, whereby a suspect cannot be compelled to speak against his/her own interest 
under official questioning by the police.
6
 
 
Over a number of centuries, the right to silence became well-established in most 
common law jurisdictions
7
 and it is also now specifically set out within a number of 
international agreements (e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966:Art 14; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 1994:Art 20; Statute of 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1993:Art 21; Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court 1998:Art 55; European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms 1950:Art 6). The historic underpinnings of the right have 
been rehearsed in many quarters and there is little value in an expansive reproduction 
                                                 
4
 Zuckerman suggests that the ‘privilege against self-incrimination’ is a misnomer as the accused must 
be presumed innocent until proven otherwise, therefore he suggests that the term ‘right to silence’ may 
in fact be more accurate (Zuckerman 1989:305). This article will primarily employ the term ‘right to 
silence’. 
5
 See the judgment of Lord Mustill in R. v Director of the Serious Fraud Office, ex p. Smith. 
6
 The trial-based right to silence, effectively the right not to testify, was established first. A pre-trial 
equivalent was later recognised in order to protect the trial-based right (McGrath 2005:11.70). See also 
R v Director of Serious Fraud Office, ex parte Smith (at 32). 
7
 For example, England and Wales, Ireland, Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. 
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of same here. Suffice it to say that while differences of opinion on the exact impetus 
for the protection of the right and the exact timing of its emergence on the criminal 
justice scene may abound,
8
 it is a long-seated, well-established right. 
 
Various rationales have been put forward for the right, both at the trial and pre-trial 
stages: personal autonomy and the dignity of the individual, including the right to 
privacy (Dennis 1995; Wilson J in Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v Canada (Director of 
Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission))  and the 
protection of the individual from cruel choices (Goldberg J in Murphy v Waterfront 
Commission of New York Harbor; Walsh and Martens JJ in Saunders v United 
Kingdom); the presumption of innocence (O’Connor and Cooney 1980:236); the 
prevention of police abuse of power (Zuckerman 1989:318; Dennis 1995:350/351); 
and, the right to freedom of expression (Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland). It is 
perhaps a combination of all of these which truly accounts for the existence and 
ongoing protection of the right to silence. However, there is a divergence of views on 
this right. Some see it as an important protection for the suspect in the criminal 
process, while others view it as a hindrance to the investigative efforts of police and to 
the ultimate goal of the criminal process, i.e. the prosecution and repression of crime 
(Cross 1970-71; Criminal Law Revision Committee 1972; Zuckerman 1989; Working 
Group on the Right to Silence 1989; McConville et al 1991; Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice 1993; Zuckerman 1994; Dennis 1995; Leo 1996; Mirfield 1997; 
                                                 
8
 Some commentators have traced the roots of the right to silence to the 13th century when the English 
ecclesiastical courts began to administer the ‘oath ex officio’ in their search for heretics and a later 
public revulsion to the practice: per Walsh J in Saunders v United Kingdom. Others have suggested that 
its origins are to be found later, in an aversion to the practices of the ecclesiastical and prerogative 
courts of the 17th century: the ‘High Commission’ and the ‘Star Chamber’ (Wigmore 1940; Herman 
1992; Easton 1998). More have contended that while the phraseology of the right to silence/privilege 
against self-incrimination was employed earlier, it was not until the mid-18th century that it truly 
became a substantive part of the common law under the influence of defence counsel and the 
progression of the adversarial model of criminal procedure which brought about its ultimate acceptance 
(Langbein 1994). 
  5 
Easton 1998). This dichotomy of views was clear in the discussion on the introduction 
of inference-drawing provisions in NSW. The government and the police  argued for 
greater investigative powers while most other stakeholders argued for the preservation 
of this fundamental, procedural protection. 
 
While Ireland is a good comparator jurisdiction for NSW on this issue, one significant 
difference between the jurisdictions in relation to the protection of the right to silence 
must be acknowledged at the outset: the right is protected at common law in 
Australia, with additional legislative prohibition of inferences from pre-trial silence 
provided under s 89 of the Evidence Act 1995; however, the right has constitutional 
status under Bunreacht na hÉireann, the Constitution of Ireland 1937. This difference 
is not as pronounced as might initially seem to be the case as the protection afforded 
to the right in NSW, and indeed throughout Australia generally, has been of a very 
high level
9
 and, by comparison, the elevated status of the right in Ireland has failed to 
prevent its significant curtailment.
10
 
  
Ireland: First into the fray 
Ireland was not the first common law jurisdiction to introduce inference-drawing 
provisions, but it may have been the first to interfere with the right to silence in 
                                                 
9
 See, for example, Hammond v The Commonwealth where Brennan J described the right to silence as 
‘a freedom so treasured by tradition and so central to the judicial administration of criminal justice’ (at 
3) and the more recent case of R v Seller and McCarthy where Garling J noted the ‘regard which is 
paid to the privilege against self-incrimination in the United States of America’ and, while 
acknowledging the constitutional protection afforded to the privilege in the latter jurisdiction, further 
stated that ‘the source of the privilege, and the reasons for its continued existence are similar in both 
Australia, as a part of the common law, and in the US as a part of the Constitution’ (at 153). 
10
 Although no explicit reference to the right to silence is made in the text of the Irish Constitution, the 
Supreme Court has declared its constitutional status. See Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland and the 
discussion in the text below. 
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modern times.
11
 And rather than tread gently upon a well-established right of this 
nature, the Irish legislature trampled upon it with gusto. 
 
The Irish criminal process bears the scars of the so-called ‘Troubles’ in Northern 
Ireland. The conflict in that jurisdiction has spilled over into the Republic of Ireland 
on a number of occasions and the fear of an escalation in violence relating to the 
‘Troubles’ along with a desire to control those planning criminality either north or 
south of the border has led to the introduction of draconian measures over the years. 
More often than not, measures initially enacted as extraordinary powers relating to 
paramilitary activity have become normalised and have, in time, extended to the 
ordinary corpus of the criminal law (Walsh 1989; Hillyard 1993; Daly 2009). This is 
true, to a large extent, of incursions on the right to silence. 
 
In December 1938 and January 1939 the Irish Republican Army (the IRA) proclaimed 
that its Executive Council was the legitimate and legal government of every part of 
Ireland and it purported to declare war on the United Kingdom. The Offences Against 
the State Act 1939 was introduced as a response to this and a significant part of its 
armoury was the provision of new pre-trial, investigatory powers which had never 
before been recognised under Irish law. Among those was s 52 which provided that a 
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 In Singapore, inferences from silence have been allowed since 1977 under the Criminal Procedure 
Code (Spore) ss 122(6) and 123(1), as inserted by the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 1976 
(Spore); in Northern Ireland, inference-drawing provisions were first enacted in 1988 under the 
Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988; and in England and Wales, inferences from silence 
have been allowed since 1994 under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. The first modern 
Irish incursion on the right to silence came within the Offences Against the State Act 1939. In fact, if 
one looks back further, the legislature of the Irish Free State, under the Constitution (Amendment 
No.17) Act 1931, made it a criminal offence, potentially punishable by death, for an arrested person to 
refuse to answer particular questions put to him/her by police officers acting under certain prescribed 
powers. However, the Constitution of the Irish Free State was replaced by the current Irish Constitution 
in 1937 and the right to silence was held to have regained its traditionally protected position under the 
common law: Re National Irish Bank (under investigation) (No.1) per Barrington J. 
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person arrested and detained under the Act could be required by a garda
12
 to account 
for his/her movements and actions during a specified period and to give all the 
information which s/he possessed in regard to the commission or intended 
commission by another person of a specific offence. Failure or refusal to give the 
required account or information, or the provision of false or misleading information 
was an offence punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months. 
 
An offence based on pre-trial silence is, of course, a different concept to the 
inference-drawing provision which has been introduced in NSW.
13
 It is a more 
obvious barrier to the exercise of the right to remain silent because it has a more 
concrete consequence, i.e. imprisonment.  
  
The operation of s 52 was challenged before both the Irish courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights (the European Court) in Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland. 
Its constitutionality was upheld domestically, but, at a European level, it was held to 
breach Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights; the right to a fair trial. 
 
In Ireland, the courts expressed differing views on the constitutional locus of the right 
to silence. It is not an expressed right in the text of the Constitution and while the 
High Court viewed it as an important element of the right to a fair trial (Art 38.1), the 
Supreme Court located it as a corollary of the right to freedom of expression (Art 
40.6). Relying on the proviso to the freedom of expression provision, to the effect that 
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 A member of the Irish police service, an Garda Síochána (translates as the “guardians of the peace”). 
An individual police officer is referred to as a ‘garda’. The plural is ‘gardaí’. 
13
 The Search and Surveillance Act 2012 in New Zealand, by comparison, creates an offence of non-
compliance with an examination order, punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment, or a fine of up to 
$40,000 for a body corporate: s 173. One saving grace of the New Zealand law, as compared to s 52 in 
Ireland, is that there is judicial oversight through the initial authorisation of an examination order 
where certain conditions are fulfilled: s 38. 
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this right may be curtailed where the exigencies of public order or morality so require, 
the Supreme Court held that the State was entitled to restrain the citizen’s right to 
silence in pursuit of the legitimate aim of maintaining public peace and order, 
although the right must be affected as little as possible. The incursion on the right to 
silence contained in s 52 was held to be proportionate to the State’s aim of protecting 
itself and preventing the public from disorder. 
 
Finding a breach of the right to a fair trial, however, the European Court held that s 52 
involved an unacceptable interference with the right to silence as the degree of 
compulsion placed on suspects to provide information under the provision in effect 
‘destroyed the very essence of their privilege against self-incrimination and their right 
to remain silent’ (at 55). 
 
The first European Court case to recognise the right to silence/privilege against self-
incrimination was Funke v France, which centred on the production of documents. In 
that case, it was held that, although not specifically set out in the text of the ECHR, 
the right to silence/privilege against self-incrimination is protected as part of the right 
to a fair trial under Art 6 ECHR. Later, in Murray v United Kingdom, the European 
Court stated that that the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself are 
generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a 
fair procedure under Art 6 (at 45). While the facts of Heaney led the Court to find a 
breach of that article, it has on other occasions clarified that the right to silence is not 
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an absolute right and it may legitimately be curtailed in certain circumstances.
14
 This 
is discussed further below in the context of inference-drawing provisions. 
 
The Irish Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of s 52 and its inherent 
interference with the exercise of the right to silence. However, it later undermined the 
practical benefits of provisions of that nature in the context of prosecutions by holding 
that the admissibility of any statement obtained from a suspect on pain of penal 
sanction was governed by the Art 38.1 fair trial requirements and the central test 
applied in relation to such admissibility was voluntariness (Re National Irish Bank 
(under investigation) (No.1); Dunnes Stores v Ryan). While admissibility is to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis, in reality compelled statements will rarely pass a test 
of voluntariness and will therefore generally be excluded from evidence at trial. While 
arguably the gardaí might still wish to pressurise a suspect to provide information 
under the threat of the commission of an offence under s 52 even though such a 
compelled confession might not be admissible at trial, the value of offences based on 
pre-trial silence for the purposes of securing convictions was ultimately undermined 
by the Irish Supreme Court and little use of s 52, or provisions like it, is now made. 
However, the 1939 Act, the Irish Supreme Court’s stance on the constitutional 
location of the right to silence and the application of a proportionality test to 
interference with same at both a domestic and European level cleared the way for 
future further incursions on that right. 
 
Inference-drawing 
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 In Murray, the European Court held that the right to silence is not absolute and it may be allowable 
under the ECHR for the right to be interfered with by way of inference-drawing provisions in 
appropriate circumstances (at 66).  
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Inference-drawing provisions are designed to encourage suspects to answer police 
questions in the investigative stage. There are several statutory provisions in Ireland 
which aim to encourage this by providing for inferences to be drawn at trial from a 
failure or refusal to mention certain matters or answer certain questions in the pre-trial 
process. However, Irish legislation gives no indication of the types of inferences that 
might be drawn from the pre-trial silence of the accused, and neither does s 89A in 
NSW. An English Judicial Studies Board Specimen Direction lists the inferences 
which may be drawn under s 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in 
England and Wales, where the accused seeks to rely on a fact at trial which s/he did 
not mention in the pre-trial period, which, in the circumstances existing at the time 
s/he ‘could reasonably have been expected to mention’. This may give an indication 
of the future application of s 89A in relation to serious indictable offences. Under the 
Specimen Direction, possible inferences include that:  
 The fact now relied on is true but the defendant, for reasons of his own, chose 
not to reveal it;  
 The fact now relied on is irrelevant;  
 The ‘fact’ now relied on is of more recent invention;  
 The defendant’s present answer to the prosecution case is fabricated;  
 The defendant is guilty (Crown Court Bench Book 2010:261). 
 
The Irish courts have not addressed the specifics of the likely inferences to be drawn, 
nor has the legislature provided any guidance in this regard. Despite this vagueness, 
the legislature has established quite an inference arsenal in recent years. Since the 
prosecutorial value of offences based on silence has been undermined by precedent of 
both the European Court of Human Rights and the Irish Supreme Court (as outlined 
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above), inferences have taken over the mantle of curtailing pre-trial silence. Initially 
inferences could only be drawn in relation to a failure or refusal to account for marks, 
substances or objects, or presence in a particular place, where evidence of the matter 
was given in later proceedings. However, this initially restrained approach has given 
way over the years to far broader incursions on the right to silence. 
  
The first inference-drawing provisions were promulgated in the Criminal Justice Act 
1984 and sought to induce answers to quite specific questions, raised on the basis of 
existing evidence. Section 18 allowed for an adverse inference to be drawn at trial 
against an accused person, who, following arrest, failed or refused to account, on 
being requested to do so by a garda, for the presence of any object, substance or mark 
on his/her person, clothing or footwear, or in his/her possession, or in the place where 
s/he was arrested. Section 19 allowed for an inference to be drawn from failure or 
refusal to account for presence at a particular place, in similar circumstances.
15
 These 
provisions, which were and still are applicable to all arrestable offences,
16
clearly 
interfere with the right to silence, by attaching consequences to its exercise. However, 
as compared with s 52 of the 1939 Act before them, and with the broader provisions 
which later followed, the level of intrusion occasioned on the right is diluted to some 
extent by the specifics of their construction. This, along with safeguards legislatively 
attached to the provisions, and a number of other protections, meant that they were 
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 The garda who requests the relevant information must hold a reasonable belief that the presence of 
the object, substance or mark, or the suspect’s presence at a particular place, may be attributable to the 
suspect’s participation in the commission of the offence for which s/he has been arrested. Provisions 
similar to ss 18 and 19 had previously been introduced in Northern Ireland under the ss 5 and 6 of the 
Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988. 
16
 Any offence which is potentially punishable by at least five years imprisonment: Criminal Law Act 
1997, section 2 (1), as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2006, s 8. 
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accepted as a proportionate interference with the constitutionally protected right to 
silence in Rock v Ireland.
17
 
 
In time, however, inference-drawing provisions which were broader in their operation 
were introduced, though they were initially confined to offences of a specific nature. 
In 1996, a provision, applicable only to drug-trafficking offences, was introduced 
whereby an inference could be drawn against an accused at trial for failure to 
mention, during the pre-trial process, a fact which s/he later relied on in his/her 
defence which s/he ought reasonably to have mentioned at the time of questioning or 
charging (Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 s 7). In 1998, an identical 
provision was promulgated which applied in the case of offences against the state 
(Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1998 s 5). These provisions mirrored s 
34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in England and Wales.  
 
In 2007, the legislative decision was made to allow inferences to be drawn from pre-
trial silence in relation to all serious offences, and so the 1996 and 1998 provisions 
were repealed and replaced by s 19A of the Criminal Justice Act 1984, as inserted by 
the Criminal Justice Act 2007. Section 19A provides that an inference may be drawn 
from the pre-trial failure of the accused to ‘mention any fact relied on in his[/her]… 
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 As in Heaney, the Supreme Court stated that the pre-trial right to silence is protected as a corollary of 
the right to freedom of expression but it may be restricted in order to serve the exigencies of public 
order and morality. It was held that ss 18 and 19 were proportionate as they represented the necessary 
balance between the right to silence and the duty of the State to defend and protect the life, person and 
property of all its citizens. The court also held that two important limiting factors were in operation to 
combat any perceived imbalance. First, the inferences which might be drawn were evidential in nature 
only and could not be the sole basis for any conviction. Secondly, in deciding what inferences may be 
drawn, the court is obliged to act in accordance with the principles of constitutional justice and, having 
regard to an accused’s right to a fair trial, is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that no improper 
or unfair inferences are drawn from the relevant silence (at 501). 
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defence…being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time clearly called 
for an explanation’.18 
 
Certain pre-requisites and safeguards (which also apply to ss 18 and 19) are set out in 
the legislation creating s 19A: 
 a person shall not be convicted solely or mainly on an inference drawn,19 
although, any inference drawn may amount to corroboration of any evidence 
in relation to which the failure is material;  
 inferences can only be drawn where the accused has been told in ordinary 
language that it may harm the credibility of his/her defence if s/he does not 
mention something which s/he later relies on in court;  
 no inference ought to be drawn unless the accused was afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to consult a solicitor before his/her failure to account for the 
relevant matters or to mention the relevant fact;
 
 
 the court or jury in deciding whether or not to draw inferences ought to 
consider when the account or fact concerned was first mentioned by the 
accused;
 
and 
 no inference shall be drawn in relation to a question asked in an interview 
unless either the interview has been electronically recorded or the detained 
person has consented in writing to the non-recording of the interview.
 
 
 
Despite the existence of these safeguards, s 19A severely impedes the pre-trial 
exercise of the right to silence by placing pressure on persons suspected of 
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 For a discussion of the slightly quirky phrasing of s 19A see Daly 2007. 
19
 The current NSW proposal suggests that an inference cannot be drawn if it is the only evidence of 
guilt (s 89A(3)). Besides this cumbersome wording, this does not prohibit conviction mainly on the 
basis of such an inference.  
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involvement in any arrestable offence to provide details of all matters to questioning 
gardaí so as to ensure that a jury at trial will not be invited to consider pre-trial silence 
as symptomatic of guilt.  
 
The formulation of s 19A requires that an inference can only be drawn from the 
failure to mention a particular fact when (i) such a fact ‘clearly called for an 
explanation’ during the pre-trial period, and (ii) it was a fact which the suspect sought 
to rely upon at trial. Sections 18 and 19 as originally formulated required that 
‘evidence of the said matters’, i.e. the account not originally given, was given at trial, 
but this was removed under the 2007 Act and the current requirement is only that the 
relevant fact ‘clearly called for’ an explanation at the pre-trial stage of questioning. 
The double threshold requirement of s 19A then is more stringent than the 
reformulated ss 18 and 19. This double threshold is also a component of s 89A in 
NSW. A far lower threshold exists in relation to the most recent weapon in the Irish 
legislature’s inference-drawing arsenal though: s 72A of the Criminal Justice Act 
2006, as inserted by the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009.  
 
Section 72A applies to the rather broadly-drawn concept of participating in or 
contributing to any activity of a ‘criminal organisation’.20 In such cases, an inference 
may be drawn at trial from the pre-trial failure of a suspect to ‘answer a question 
material to the investigation of the offence’. The safeguards applicable to ss 18, 19 
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 A ‘criminal organisation’ is defined under s 70 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 as amended by s 3 
of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009 as ‘a structured group, however organised, that has as 
its main purpose or activity the commission or facilitation of a serious offence’. A ‘structured group’ is 
defined as ‘a group of 3 or more persons, which is not randomly formed for the immediate commission 
of a single offence, and the involvement in which by 2 or more of those persons is with a view to their 
acting in concert; for the avoidance of doubt, a structured group may exist notwithstanding the absence 
of all or any of the following: (a) formal rules or formal membership, or any formal roles for those 
involved in the group; (b) any hierarchical or leadership structure; (c) continuity of involvement by 
persons in the group.’  
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and 19A are replicated in relation to s 72A. A question is not to be regarded as being 
material to the investigation of the offence unless the garda concerned reasonably 
believed that the question related to the participation of the defendant in the 
commission of the offence.  
 
 ‘Any question material to the investigation of the offence’ includes, inter alia,  
 a request that the suspect give a full account of his/her movements, actions, 
activities or associations during any specified period relevant to the offence 
being investigated;  
 questions related to statements or conduct of the suspect implying or leading 
to a reasonable inference that s/he was at a material time directing the 
activities of a criminal organisation;  
 and, questions relating to any benefit that the suspect may have obtained from 
directing a criminal organisation or committing a serious offence within a 
criminal organisation.  
 
Unlike the double threshold requirement of s 19A or even the ‘clearly called for’ pre-
requisite of ss 18 and 19, under s 72A an inference against the accused may be drawn 
ostensibly on the grounds that s/he refused to co-operate with the investigation into 
his/her guilt. It seems that an inference may be drawn whether or not an answer to the 
particular question was ‘clearly called for’ or the failure to provide such an answer is 
a specifically relevant matter in the context of the later trial. Failure alone gives rise to 
the inference.  
 
  16 
Section 72A, more than ever before, moves the focus of the criminal case from the 
courtroom and the legal defence of the charge to the garda station and the initial 
investigation of the offence and it places a heavy onus on the suspect within the pre-
trial process to provide the gardaí with information on which to base their further 
investigations. While it may be confined to the context of ‘organised crime’, s 72A is 
symptomatic of the ongoing shift backwards from the public courtroom to the private 
police interrogation room. Protections for suspects in the police station have not kept 
pace with the erosion of the traditionally-protected right to silence and the apparent 
shift in the centre of gravity of the criminal process.
21
  
 
This is not only an Irish phenomenon, but is a feature of many modern criminal 
justice systems. In the context of the right to silence, John Jackson (2009) has noted 
the sidelining of the courts in favour of the police station. He suggests that states are 
‘increasingly ‘front-loading’ the forensic enterprise [of fact-finding] into the pre-trial 
phase in order to expedite proceedings’ (Jackson 2009:851). He further suggests that 
there is no reason why this should not be done, so long as, importantly, there are 
suitable safeguards in place. If the police station is becoming more like a courtroom 
on the prosecution side, then courtroom-like protections should exist on the defence 
side also. Jackson recommends that 
‘[a]t the point when there is a basis in evidence for putting allegations against 
a suspect, he or she ought arguably to be given the same or equivalent defence 
rights as are available at trial which include, most importantly, access to legal 
advice, disclosure of the evidence against him and an authenticated record of 
any interview either by audio or video tape. But such safeguards cannot be 
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 Packer considered that the centre of gravity of ‘crime control’ model (as opposed to his ‘due process’ 
model) would have its centre of gravity in the early, non-adjudicative pre-trial stage of the criminal 
process (Packer 1968:162). 
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effective unless they are accompanied by a Miranda-style rule prohibiting any 
questioning until they are put in place and because … suspects are inevitably 
put under pressure when faced with criminal allegations, especially when they 
are in custodial interrogation, suspects in custody should not be able to waive 
these rights, at least not until they have had an opportunity to speak to a 
lawyer’ (Jackson 2009:851; Miranda v Arizona). 
 
He goes on to argue that the right to silence should be given a special weighting at the 
pre-trial stage so that a suspect is afforded procedural and effective defence rights 
from the earliest stages of the criminal process (Jackson 2009:852-853). This would 
be based on a recognition of the vulnerable position of suspects in the pre-trial 
interrogational stage of the criminal process and the potential risk of false 
confessions. Jackson suggests that when a certain level of evidence exists against the 
suspect he may then be invited to respond to the allegations made against him 
(Jackson 2009:853-854). He could, as at trial, admit to these allegations, answer 
questions, refuse to answer questions and submit to judicial inquiry, or offer a written 
explanation of his conduct. 
 
This is not the position provided for under any of the provisions on the statutebook in 
Ireland, or the newly-introduced s 89A in NSW. While certain safeguards may be 
provided, they are not of the extent suggested by Jackson and, as explained below, in 
both the Irish and NSW situations even the right to legal advice is not as strong a 
protection as it might seem at first glance.  
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Legal advice and the right to silence: The view from the European Court of 
Human Rights 
A defence to a criminal charge is a legal construct and the question of what fact or 
facts should be mentioned in pre-trial questioning in order to later make out a specific 
defence is a difficult one for a suspect. Defences such as self-defence, provocation, 
duress and insanity, for example, have legal meanings which may not be readily 
apparent to the layman. Access to legal advice for suspects whose pre-trial failure to 
mention a particular fact might later be the basis for adverse inference is therefore of 
utmost importance.  
 
The link between the right to silence and the right to legal advice has been specifically 
made by the European Court of Human Rights. In Murray v United Kingdom, a 
breach of Art 6 ECHR was found, not on the grounds of inferences being drawn from 
pre-trial silence per se, but because the suspect against whom the inference-drawing 
legislation was invoked was denied access to legal advice in the initial stages of his 
detention. The Court held that the right to silence is not absolute and it upheld the 
inference-drawing provisions of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 
1988. The Court stated that the decision as to whether or not the drawing of adverse 
inferences from a suspect’s pre-trial silence was in violation of his/her rights under 
Art 6 should be determined in light of all the circumstances of a given case, having 
particular regard to the situations where inferences may be drawn, the weight to be 
attached to them by the national courts in their assessment of the evidence and the 
degree of compulsion inherent in the situation (at 47). The Court stated that 
‘National laws may attach consequences to the attitude of an accused at the 
initial stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the prospects of the 
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defence in any subsequent criminal proceedings.  In such circumstances 
Article 6…will normally require that the accused be allowed to benefit from 
the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation’ 
(at 63). 
 
In the context of the inference-drawing provisions of the Northern Ireland Order, the 
Court held that ‘it is of paramount importance for the rights of the defence that an 
accused has access to a lawyer at the initial stages of police interrogation’ (at 66). 
Furthermore, the Court declared that  
‘[t]o deny access to a lawyer for the first 48 hours of police questioning, in a 
situation where the rights of the defence may well be irretrievably prejudiced, 
is - whatever the justification for such denial - incompatible with the rights of 
the accused under Article 6’ (at 66). 
 
This is a clear statement from the European Court of Human Rights on the importance 
of legal advice to ensure fairness to a suspect who is faced with the possibility that his 
silence under police questioning may have adverse consequences for him at trial.  
 
The European Court has had to consider the practical implications of the connection 
between the right to legal advice and the right to silence, through a series of cases 
centring on the operation of s 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in 
England and Wales. The essential pragmatic question was whether an inference can 
be drawn on the basis of a suspect’s failure to mention a particular fact in the pre-trial 
process where such failure was based on the advice of his/her legal adviser to remain 
silent. On the one hand, if the suspect is entitled to legal advice, surely s/he must be 
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entitled to rely on that advice. However, the inference-drawing provisions would be 
entirely defeated if every suspect could avoid their application by saying that s/he 
only failed to mention a particular fact because his/her solicitor advised him/her to 
remain silent. The domestic courts in England and Wales grappled with this for a time 
and the issue eventually came before the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
In Condron v U.K., the European Court found a breach of the right to a fair trial where 
a judicial direction had left the jury at liberty to draw an adverse inference 
notwithstanding that its members may have been satisfied that the defendant’s 
assertion that he remained silent only because he had been legally advised to do so 
was plausible.
22
 A number of cases followed in the English courts, however, which 
seemed to suggest that it was not enough to avoid an inference for the suspect to have 
simply relied upon the legal advice received; s/he must also have done so reasonably. 
In R v Howell, for example, the Court of Appeal stated that it did not consider that 
once it is shown that the legal advice given has been genuinely relied upon, adverse 
inference is thereby disallowed. On the facts therein, the Court held that there was no 
soundly based objective reason for silence and the jury was entitled to draw 
inferences from the appellant’s ‘no comment’ interview. In R v Hoare and Pierce, 
Auld L.J. stated that  
‘[t]he question in the end, which is for the jury, is whether regardless of 
advice, genuinely given and genuinely accepted, an accused has remained 
silent not because of that advice but because he had no or no satisfactory 
explanation to give’ (at 1821).  
 
                                                 
22
 This was followed by the English Court of Appeal in R v Betts and Hall.  
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This ties both genuineness and reasonableness together, though reasonableness 
remains the most important concern. 
 
In Beckles v U.K., the failure of the trial judge to direct the jury, under s 34, to 
consider the genuineness of the accused’s reasons for remaining silent led the 
European Court to find a breach of Art 6. The case was then returned to the Court of 
Appeal where Woolf C.J. stated: 
‘…in a case where a solicitor's advice is relied upon by the defendant, the 
ultimate question for the jury remains under section 34 whether the facts relied 
on at the trial were facts which the defendant could reasonably have been 
expected to mention at interview. If they were not, that is the end of the 
matter. If the jury consider that the defendant genuinely relied on the advice, 
that is not necessarily the end of the matter. It may still not have been 
reasonable for him to rely on the advice, or the advice may not have been the 
true explanation for his silence’ (R v Beckles at 2844). 
 
It seems then that reliance on legal advice to remain silent must be both genuine and 
reasonable in order to avoid the drawing of any inference allowable under statute in 
England and Wales.
23
  
 
Legal advice and the right to silence: Irish experience and NSW provisions 
Legislative compliance with the ECHR and the case-law of the European Court has 
become increasingly important in Ireland in light of the incorporation of the ECHR 
into domestic law by the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. This may 
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 This is reflected in the Judicial Studies Board Specimen Direction for s 34 cases whereby a jury must 
consider both the genuineness of the accused’s reliance on legal advice and the reasonableness of such 
reliance (Crown Court Bench Book 2010:258-267).  
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explain, in large part, the 2007 addition to all inference-drawing provisions, of the 
proviso that no inference is to be drawn unless the accused was afforded a ‘reasonable 
opportunity’ to obtain legal advice prior to the occasion on which the relevant silence 
occurred. In 2011 a further safeguard was added, though it is yet to be commenced, 
such that if a suspect who has been arrested and detained requests access to legal 
advice, he is not to be questioned until he has had an opportunity to consult with a 
solicitor.
24
 This, again, was precipitated by events at a European level. While the link 
between the right to silence and the right to legal advice was made in the European 
Court of Human Rights over fifteen years ago (Murray v United Kingdom), the Court 
clarified in 2008, in Salduz v Turkey that the right of access to legal advice is an 
essential pre-condition to any form of custodial questioning, including but not limited 
to the context of inference-drawing procedures. Furthermore, the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court applied the Salduz ruling in Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate and 
found that Scottish law, which did not require pre-trial legal advice for a detained 
suspect prior to interrogation, was incompatible with the ECHR. It seemed, 
accordingly, that the Irish position at the time, with no prohibition on questioning a 
suspect prior to the arrival of his requested solicitor, was at variance with the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence (Heffernan 2011).  
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 Criminal Justice Act 1984 s 5A as inserted by the Criminal Justice Act 2011 s 9. The period of time 
spent waiting for consultation with the solicitor is excluded in reckoning the statutorily permitted 
period of detention. This period should generally not to exceed 3 hours, or such other shorter period as 
may prescribed by ministerial regulations, though in the case of a person detained in a Garda station 
between midnight and 8 a.m. the period should not to exceed 6 hours, or such other shorter period as 
may prescribed by ministerial regulations: s 5A(2). Under s 5A(3) a detained person will be taken to 
have waived his/her right to consult a solicitor if s/he refuses to consult with one who has made 
himself/herself available for that purpose. Questioning may commence when a person waives, or is 
deemed to have waived, his/her right to consult a solicitor: s 5A(4). The requirement to refrain from 
questioning a detained person until s/he has had an opportunity to consult with a solicitor can be set 
aside by the member in charge in specified circumstances: s 5A(5).   
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While Irish legislation may, as soon as the new provision is commenced, be in line 
with the minimum standard requirements of the ECHR in relation to pre-trial legal 
advice, the Irish incarnation of that right remains weak in its construction and 
application. As in NSW, there are no duty solicitor schemes in Ireland.
25
 In the 
absence of duty solicitor schemes, not every suspect undergoing police questioning 
will gain access to legal advice. In Ireland, there is an administrative scheme to 
provide pre-trial legal advice to impecunious suspects.
26
 It is available only to those 
satisfying a means test, however, and there is no specific right for suspects to be told 
of its existence. Furthermore, there is no formal method of selecting a solicitor to 
advise a suspect who cannot name one himself/herself. Garda stations in Ireland do 
not possess lists of solicitors who are willing and likely to be available to attend at the 
garda station and provide legal advice for detained suspects. Some stations may have 
informal arrangements with certain firms or may simply provide a suspect with a 
phone book to select a solicitor, but this is wholly unsatisfactory. Without formal lists 
of appropriate solicitors in garda stations, there is a clear danger that gardaì may be 
tempted, as they were in O’Brien v D.P.P., to suggest and contact legal advisors 
knowing that they will be unavailable to attend, thereby making it possible to question 
the suspect after a certain time has elapsed. Beyond that danger, there is also a risk 
that, in the absence of a formal listing of suitable legal advisors, a suspect would be 
distrustful of a solicitor suggested to him/her by the police as s/he may suspect that 
the solicitor is favoured for some ulterior reason or is in some way colluding with the 
                                                 
25
 The idea of establishing a duty solicitor scheme in Ireland has been debated on a number of 
occasions. Most recently, the Criminal Legal Aid Review Committee concluded that a Duty Solicitor 
Scheme ought not to be established as it would lead to a lack of continuity for clients (Committee to 
Recommend Certain Safeguards for Persons in Custody and for Members of an Garda Sìochána 
1978:62; Tormey Committee 1977; Criminal Legal Aid Review Committee 2002:Chapter 3). 
26
 The Garda Síochána Station Legal Advice Scheme is an administrative scheme only and is restrictive 
in its means test (being available only to persons who are in receipt of Social Welfare payments or 
earning less than €20,316 per annum). 
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police. If that were the case, the accused’s right of access to legal advice would 
effectively be undermined as s/he would be unlikely to trust the advice of the solicitor 
in question. 
Under s 89A in NSW, there seems to be recognition of the interrelated nature of the 
rights to silence and legal advice. Inferences can only be drawn under this provision 
where the suspect was given a special caution by an investigating official prior to the 
relevant failure or refusal to mention a relevant fact, the caution was given in the 
presence of an Australian legal practitioner acting for the defendant, and the 
defendant was given an opportunity to consult in private with this legal practitioner 
about the “general nature and effect of special cautions” (s 89A(2)).27 A special 
caution is defined in s 89A(9) as  
“a caution given to a person that is to the effect that: 
(a) that person does not have to say or do anything, but it may harm the person’s 
defence if the person does not mention when questioned something the person 
later relies on in court, and 
(b) anything the person does say or do may be used in evidence.” 
 
 
The apparent meaning of s 89A(2) is that no inference can be drawn if a lawyer 
representing the suspect was not physically present during the administration of the 
special caution.
28
 Two questions present themselves in this regard (i) what about a 
                                                 
27
 Although specific reference is made to legal advice on the general nature and effect of special 
cautions, presumably the legal practitioner may also advise his client on the substance of any 
allegations or on his position generally. This is not at all clear from the wording of the provision 
though. 
28
 In his address on the Second Reading of the relevant Bill on March 13 2013 the Attorney General for 
NSW, Greg Smith, stated that “the provisions will not prevent a vulnerable person from being provided 
with the assistance of a support person during any investigative procedure; nor will they apply to 
Indigenous people who have exercised their right to speak to the Aboriginal Legal Service over the 
telephone. However, it will apply to suspects who have their lawyer present at the police station.” He 
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suspect who cannot afford to retain a lawyer?; and, (ii) what about a suspect who 
simply chooses not to retain a lawyer? 
  
The original draft legislation specifically provided that a defendant is taken not to 
have been allowed an opportunity to consult an Australian legal practitioner if the 
defendant’s means, and the circumstances, preclude the defendant from obtaining 
legal advice’ (s 89A(7) of the Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) Bill 2012). 
Although not explicitly stated in the finalised version of the Act, this principle appears 
to still apply: if a defendant cannot afford legal advice the practical result is that no 
inference can later be drawn from his silence. While this seems to alleviate the 
government from any requirement to create a duty solicitor scheme, or even to 
administer a police station advice scheme like the Irish scheme (unsatisfactory and 
limited as that is), it creates a very strange anomaly such that if you want to avoid 
having inferences drawn from your pre-trial silence it may be better to be poor than 
rich. If you cannot afford legal advice, no inference can be drawn under the 
legislation. Given the socio-economic background of the majority of offenders in the 
criminal process, this seems to render s 89A impotent from the beginning.  
 
However, it is not only the impecunious suspect who can circumvent the drawing of 
inferences under s 89A. It seems that simply choosing not to retain a lawyer during 
the pre-trial period of official questioning will render the inference-drawing provision 
similarly impotent and unworkable. While there are of course risks involved in not 
obtaining legal advice while facing police questioning, one could at least avoid the 
risks of inference-drawing by choosing not to do so. The Attorney General for NSW, 
                                                                                                                                            
further stated that “[p]resence is not defined, but its everyday interpretation means that the solicitor 
must be physically present. They are not present if they are simply in contact by telephone or some 
other electronic means.” (Smith 2013) 
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Greg Smith, suggested at the Second Reading of the relevant Bill that through the 
provisions requiring legal advice before inferences can later be drawn the new law 
“targets the higher end of criminal activity where suspects are more likely to bring 
their lawyers along when they are questioned” (Smith 2013). If the Act really sought 
to target the “higher end of criminal activity” it could have specified offences viewed 
as being of that nature rather than applying, as it does, to all serious indictable 
offences. Suggesting that the provisions relating to legal advice are a methodology to 
confine the application of the inference-drawing power, rather than side-step the 
necessity to provide state-financed legal advice, appears disingenuous. In any event, 
the Attorney General went on to note that if a suspect were to attempt to frustrate the 
operation of s 89A by not retaining a lawyer, a further opportunity exists to “require 
accused persons…to provide information” by way of the Criminal Procedure 
Amendment (Mandatory Pre-Trial Defence Disclosure) Act 2013. 
 
This Act was introduced as part of a joint package with the Evidence Amendment 
(Evidence of Silence) Act 2013. It mandates both prosecution and defence pre-trial 
disclosure and attaches adverse consequences, in the form of unfavourable inferences, 
to defective defence disclosure (s 146A). In Ireland, while certain defence disclosure 
requirements are in place (e.g. alibi defence, notice of intention to call expert witness, 
notice of intention to call evidence of mental condition etc) no inferences can be 
drawn from failure to comply with the requirements. The potential consequence of 
non-compliance is that the evidence becomes inadmissible, though it may be admitted 
at the discretion of the court (see for example the Criminal Justice Act 1984 s 20, as 
amended). In England and Wales, however, inferences can be drawn from defective 
defence disclosure under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 as 
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amended. As envisioned for the NSW provisions, in England and Wales “no 
comment” interviews are often accompanied by defective defence disclosure and lead 
to the drawing of inferences on two grounds (e.g. R v Essa). The consequent elevated 
level of influence of inference-drawing provisions on a criminal trial ought to be a 
cause for concern, hesitation and consideration. The opposite seems to have been the 
case in NSW, where both pieces of legislation were enacted with some haste: the 
relevant Bills were introduced on March 13
th
 and assented to on March 25
th
. 
 
Returning to the operation of 89A, an issue which arises in the context of a detained 
suspect who does retain a lawyer is whether or not such lawyer ought to be present 
throughout the interrogation in which a relevant failure or refusal to mention a fact 
occurs. So long as the lawyer was present at the time of cautioning and there was an 
opportunity for the suspect to consult with him on the general nature and effect of the 
special caution, the inference can be drawn and there is no requirement for the 
ongoing presence of a lawyer. A distinction between the Irish right to pre-trial legal 
advice and that in operation in NSW is notable here. Although s 89A may not require 
the presence of a lawyer throughout interrogation, there is no prohibition on same. In 
Ireland, by contrast, a suspect is entitled to telephone or meet with his/her legal 
adviser during the period of his detention at a garda station, but, there is no recognised 
right to have the adviser present during interview.
29
 The Irish right to legal advice is 
one of ‘reasonable access’ only. Its parameters have not been fully explored, but in 
practice it seems that a suspect will be entitled to one hour of consultation with his/her 
legal adviser in every six hours of detention, or ten minutes per one hour of detention 
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 In the seminal case of People (D.P.P.) v Healy the Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment as to 
whether or not the right of ‘reasonable access’ to pre-trial legal advice encompassed a right to have 
one’s solicitor present throughout Garda interrogation. Later courts have, rather bluntly, accepted that 
there is no such right (Lavery v Member-in-Charge, Carrickmacross Garda Station; Barry v Waldron).   
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(White 2000:17-18). In the context of inference-drawing provisions this carries 
specific dangers. While the accused might be provided a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to 
consult with his/her solicitor in the early stages of his detention, if questioning takes a 
turn in a new, previously unforeseen direction and the solicitor is not present to 
advise, the suspect is left without the benefit of relevant legal advice. It seems 
advisable for a suspect subject to the operation of s 89A in NSW who has retained a 
lawyer to opt to have him present throughout interrogation. Having said that, while 
the European Court of Human Rights has emphasised the link between the right to 
silence and access to pre-trial legal advice it has not, to date, insisted that solicitors be 
present throughout interrogation 
 
Legal professional privilege 
Whether a suspect accesses legal advice only in advance of police interview, or has 
his solicitor present throughout, a difficulty which may later arise if he seeks to avoid 
the drawing of inferences from silence during such interview relates to legal 
professional privilege. This issue arose in the context of s 34 in England and Wales. 
Legal professional privilege is an important procedural protection afforded to accused 
persons in the criminal justice system. Its rationale is that a client should feel free to 
explain everything to his/her legal adviser without fear that such information will be 
used against him/her or will go beyond his/her confidential relationship with his/her 
legal adviser. If an accused person were to claim that his/her solicitor, to whom s/he 
explained everything, advised a ‘no comment’ interview and that was why the 
accused did not consider it reasonable to mention any particular fact at that time, it 
might well be necessary for the solicitor, to avoid the drawing of inferences, to clarify 
the reasons for his/her advice, and thus privilege would be waived. Once privilege is 
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waived, the prosecution are free to ask questions on all of the communications 
between the suspect and his/her solicitor.  
 
The effect of s 34 on legal professional privilege was alluded to in R v Beckles where 
Lord Woolf C.J. noted the following:  
‘Where the reason put forward by a defendant for not answering questions is 
that he is acting on legal advice, the position is singularly delicate. On the one 
hand the Courts have not unreasonably wanted to avoid defendants driving a 
coach and horses through section 34 and by so doing defeating the statutory 
objective. Such an explanation is very easy for a defendant to advance and 
difficult to investigate because of legal professional privilege. On the other 
hand, it is of the greatest importance that defendants should be able to be 
advised by their lawyer without their having to reveal the terms of that advice 
if they act in accordance with that advice’ (at 2843). 
 
If pressure is placed on a suspect who wishes to avoid the drawing of adverse 
inferences to waive his/her legal professional privilege so as to explain to the jury the 
grounds on which silence was advised and facts were therefore not mentioned, there is 
a threat to the continued existence of a meaningful legal professional privilege. This, 
in turn, threatens the quality of legal advice which can be provided to suspects 
detained for questioning by the police.  
 
Conclusion 
The complexity of explaining inference-drawing provisions to a jury creates 
difficulties in itself. It seems an onerous and confusing task for a jury to determine, ex 
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post facto, whether a particular suspect genuinely relied on the advice which s/he 
received from his/her solicitor and whether it was reasonable in the circumstances as 
they existed at that time for him/her to do so. Furthermore, the very fact of inviting 
the jury to choose to draw inferences from silence if it sees fit carries the danger of 
potentially placing an unwarranted level of emphasis on the failure of the suspect to 
mention a particular fact in the pre-trial process, in the eyes of the jury. The primary 
question for the jury, of course, is whether or not the accused is guilty. Complicated 
judicial directions on the inferences which may or may not be drawn may unduly 
distract from this central question. 
 
A related point centres on the value of evidence of silence. Clearly, the aim of 
inference-drawing provisions is to encourage a suspect in the pre-trial process to 
provide information to the police, but the evidential value of inferences drawn from 
failure to mention a specific fact relied on at trial must be questioned. There could be 
many reasons not consistent with guilt for this failure, e.g. embarrassment, distrust of 
the police, and misunderstanding. Furthermore, s 89A in NSW does not include any 
requirement of police disclosure of existing evidence in advance of questioning where 
silence leads to possible inference. The interference with silence might be more 
palatable, and indeed stronger in evidentiary terms, if it did. It can be suggested, in 
any event, that a strong case against a particular accused does not need to rely on 
inferences from silence and a weak case should not result in conviction based only, or 
even primarily, on such inference alone. Irish legislative provisions specifically make 
this point, requiring that a conviction should not be based solely or mainly on an 
inference, but the  NSW legislation only prohibits reliance on inference as the sole 
basis for conviction (s 89A(5)(b)). This element of s 89A (and indeed s 146A(3) of 
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the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Mandatory Pre-Trial Defence Disclosure) Act 
2013) should certainly be reviewed at an early opportunity.  
The absence of duty solicitor schemes is another issue which ought to be reviewed. 
The NSW legislature’s efforts to side-step the necessity of creating a duty solicitor, or 
similar, scheme by providing that inferences shall not be drawn against a suspect who 
has not been cautioned in the presence of an Australian legal practitioner and had an 
opportunity to consult in private with such a practitioner about the nature and effect of 
such a caution are clumsy and half-hearted. In an alleged attempt to apply the 
inference-drawing provision to offences at the “higher end of criminal activity”, the 
legislature has deemed s 89A almost inapplicable from the outset by allowing that no 
inferences can be drawn against a suspect who did not have access to legal advice.  As 
it becomes clear that inferences are easily avoided by not retaining a lawyer, s 89A 
may be rendered toothless in a large number of cases. 
 
Of course, that, in this author’s view would be a good thing! Interference with the 
right to silence achieves little in reality, creates complications and confusion, and 
opens the gate to further intrusions on well-established rights in the future. If the 
development of the Irish criminal process shows nothing else, it shows that legislation 
enacted to address specific perceived needs at a given time easily finds itself in 
operation in broader contexts, gaining legitimacy through enactment, usage and the 
passage of time. Interferences with the right to silence in Ireland have suffered from 
‘function creep’, to the detriment of the protection of that right. Bit by bit, little by 
little, incursions on the right to silence have altered and expanded. The acceptance of 
s 89A in NSW along with inference-drawing provisions relating to defective defence 
disclosure, may lead to the same type of normalisation and expansion of interference 
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with the long-established right to silence and once the Rubicon has been crossed, the 
other states of Australia may well follow suit. 
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